
Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Secretariat

This for ER file

(Subj. Sdradegie Alfense, Initialie Offin (SDID)



Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/07 : CIA-RDP97M00248R0005002	220031-8 25X1
NIO/FDIA 14 August 1985	j.
The SDIO: A Security Threat to NRO Technology	25X1
I have been examining the counterintelligence and security issue involved in the protection of sensitive NRP technology. One of the issues to surface with the NRO was the concern that key technologies they are developing and testing now for deployment near the end of the will be compromised in the near-term as a result of the public debate by government officials insensitive to the protection of intelligence and methods. The NRO's principal concern is that early Soviet awarer such plans could stimulate countermeasures development long before US deployment, thereby minimizing the effectiveness of the proposed programment.	first , which he decade, e on SDI e sources ness of
During the past 30 days I have interviewed NRO and Intelligence personnel involved with either technology development and/or intellig support who are familiar with the SDIO. Their comments lead me to the following conclusions:	
The current security apparatus within the SDIO is not ad protect intelligence sources and methods. We have been there is no professional security officer there, the few assigned this duty have it as a secondary duty, and they familiar enough with security to be effective. Storage facilities for classified documents are inadequate and d control appears to be in disarray.	told that officers are not
There appears to be a lack of appreciation among those i with SDI, and especially those within the SDIO, about the potential negative impact on future collection systems refrom their disclosure of NRP-related technologies. It is that SDIO officers are trying to be responsive to the White desire to sell the program but they are doing so with insufficient regard for the needs of the Intelligence Community.	e high esulting
Intelligence support to the SDIO is uneven at best, stemme the organizational placement of the few qualified persons within that office who could assure a continuous flow of intelligence and assist in its interpretation. Better intelligence support could stem the volume of inadvertent disclosures.	nel
Some potential improvements:	
Strengthen the CIA (DI and DS&T) intelligence support to	SD10. 25X1
TOP SECRET	25X1

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/07 : CIA-RDP97M00248R000500220031-8

-- Offering a security support team to the SDIO. This team could serve as a permanent security element similar in concept to the one that has served so effectively for the NRO over the years. An alternative would be to loan such a team for 2-3 years until SDIO personnel are adequately trained and indoctrinated.

25X1

-- Offering an Office of Security inspection of the SDIO facility, including its procedures for transport, storage and general protection of classified Community documents. This would be a one time effort to establish a security baseline and to identify areas for improvement.

25X1

-- A security awareness program for SDIO, the NRO, and other appropriate elements in order to inform them of the damage to future collection programs resulting from the disclosure today of NRP programs. Briefings could be provided on the record of Soviet response to compromise and other disclosure.

25X1

2

TOP SECRET